

Biology X, Fall 2010

Some more game theory and signaling games

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2010-10-25

see Gintis, *Game theory evolving*

Overview

More on solution concepts

Nash's theorem

Equilibrium refinements

Signaling games

Solution concepts

A lot of game theory is about solution concepts.

- ▶ Given a game, how would/should players act?
- ▶ Usually circular reasoning
- ▶ Solution concepts provide a way out
- ▶ Many stability / equilibrium concepts capturing various intuitions

Basic important issues:

- ▶ Existence: is there always guaranteed to be one?
- ▶ Equilibrium selection: which one is most reasonable, if there is more than one?

Nash's theorem

Theorem

Every finite game has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.

Proof.

Using a kind of **best-response dynamics**:

For any mixed strategy σ and player i , let

$$b_i(\sigma_{-i}) = \{\sigma'_i \mid \sigma'_i \text{ is a best response to } \sigma_{-i}\}$$


and let

$$b(\sigma) = b_1(\sigma_{-1}) \times \cdots \times b_n(\sigma_{-n}).$$

By definition, any σ with $\sigma \in b(\sigma)$ is a Nash equilibrium.


By Kakutani's fixed point theorem, such a σ exists. □

Subgame perfect equilibria



- ▶ incredible threat
- ▶ subgame perfect equilibrium requires Nash equilibrium at all subtrees
- ▶ different with pre-commitment

Backward induction



- ▶ Centipede game
- ▶ Backward induction gives subgame perfect equilibrium
- ▶ Lots of philosophical discussion about rationality

Evolutionarily stable strategy

- ▶ Consider population repeatedly playing a **stage game**
- ▶ Stage game is symmetric in strategies and payoffs

- ▶ Assume σ reflects the current state of the population,
 τ a small mutant population
- ▶ Idea: population is stable if it cannot be invaded by mutants

- ▶ σ is an **Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS)** iff
 - ▶ $\pi(\sigma, \sigma) > \pi(\tau, \sigma)$
(σ is better in most encounters)
 - ▶ or $\pi(\sigma, \sigma) = \pi(\tau, \sigma)$ and $\pi(\sigma, \tau) > \pi(\tau, \tau)$
(σ is as good as τ in most, but better in rare encounters)

Trembling hand perfect equilibrium

		Bob	
		L	R
Ann	U	1, 1	2, 0
	D	0, 2	2, 2

- ▶ Two pure-strategy Nash equilibria: (U, L) , (D, R)
- ▶ Only (U, L) is stable against small “mistakes” (trembling hand perfect)
- ▶ (D, R) gives more payoff but is more “risky”

Outline

More on solution concepts

Nash's theorem

Equilibrium refinements

Signaling games

Signaling phenomena

- ▶ Gazelles jump vertically when they see a cheetah
- ▶ Vervet monkeys have alarm calls for different predators
- ▶ Employees use degrees to signal their education

Gazelle and cheetah

- ▶ Gazelle has two types: Fit, Sick
- ▶ Gazelle has two signals: Jump, Don't jump
- ▶ Cheetah has two actions: Chase, Leave

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- ▶ Coevolution establishes an equilibrium in which information is transmitted

Signaling games

- ▶ Sender has a “type” (state, private information)
 - ▶ Sender chooses a signal
 - ▶ Receiver responds by choosing an action
 - ▶ Payoffs depend on type and action (and signal)
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- ▶ A sender strategy maps types to signals
 - ▶ A receiver strategy maps signals to actions
 - ▶ An equilibrium is a pair of strategies such that neither can improve by deviating

How can this be applied to intercell signaling?

- ▶ Cells are both senders and receivers
- ▶ What are the states and the actions?
- ▶ What are the payoffs?
- ▶ How about coevolution in a uniclonal (multicellular) setting?
- ▶ ...