[FOM] FOM Condition beta of Tarski's Convention T.
regimented at gmail.com
Thu Jun 21 18:45:27 EDT 2012
I'm pretty sure that Marian David discusses condition beta in his
contribution to Douglas Patterson's recent anthology of essays on Tarski
and philosophy. David's essay is: ``Tarski's Convention T and the Concept
of Truth." I can't recall specific details however.
On Wed, Jun 20, 2012 at 10:43 AM, John Corcoran <corcoran at buffalo.edu>wrote:
> I am looking for published and unpublished discussions of condition beta of
> Tarski's Convention T.
> Tarski's Convention T-which defines "adequate definition of
> truth"-contains two conditions, alpha and beta, that are separately
> necessary and jointly sufficient, LOGIC, SEMANTICS, METAMATHEMATICS [=LSM],
> pp. 187-8. Alpha requires that all instances of the T Schema be provable-a
> condition elsewhere called "material adequacy", LSM, p. 404. Beta requires
> in effect the provability of 'every truth is a sentence'. Beta is one way
> recognizing a fact repeatedly emphasized by Tarski: sentences-as opposed to
> "pre-sentences" having free occurrences of variables-exhaust the range of
> applicability of true; it is part of the meaning of true that attribution
> true to a given thing presupposes the thing is a sentence, LSM, pp. 186-8,
> 195-7. The necessity of beta is highlighted by the fact that alpha is
> satisfied by the recursively definable concept of being satisfied by every
> sequence, which Tarski rejects as inadequate, LSM, p.189 and which he
> supplements with the condition of being a sentence in the famous
> truth-definition, LSM, p.195.
> John Corcoran
> University of Buffalo
> Buffalo NY 14260-4150
> FOM mailing list
> FOM at cs.nyu.edu
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
More information about the FOM