[FOM] Kripke's outline of a theory of truth
hdeutsch at ilstu.edu
Tue Feb 21 22:29:58 EST 2012
Godel emphasizes that a proposition undecidable at a certain level is decidable at a "later" level, presumably one with a truth predicate applying to the earlier level. What are the problems with this? Does it have to do with the definition of satisfaction?
On Feb 20, 2012, at 1:35 PM, Timothy Y. Chow wrote:
> I know I have asked this question before, but I don't remember whether it
> was on FOM, and more importantly, I can't seem to find where I stashed the
> answer in my own files.
> In Kripke's "Outline of a Theory of Truth," he makes the following
> comment, "To my surprise, I have found that the problem of defining the
> languages of transfinite level presents substantial technical difficulties
> which have never seriously been investigated." He then goes on to say
> that he has some partial results but doesn't go into detail.
> What difficulties was Kripke talking about and have they been surmounted
> by subsequent researchers?
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