[FOM] Richard Epstein's view
Timothy Y. Chow
tchow at alum.mit.edu
Thu Apr 5 11:33:10 EDT 2012
On Thu, 5 Apr 2012, Sara L. Uckelman wrote:
> I took the point of your earlier message as to be giving a theory of
> truth which would be able to encompass a particular view about the truth
> of mathematical statements, in which case being able to deal with
> possibility is a necessary component.
This last part is what I don't see. Why is being able to deal with
possibility a necessary component of any account of mathematical truth?
We could easily fulfill the dream of the QED project and create a complete
formalized repository of all mathematical theorems (in set theory or type
theory, say) without ever having to consider necessity/possibility.
Possible truth of mathematical theorems arises only informally, as in my
example of "the Riemann hypothesis might be true," and nobody thinks of
these as strictly *mathematical* statements.
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