Re: [FOM] Falsify Platonism‏‏

James M jamesthebod at
Thu Apr 29 03:42:47 EDT 2010

It seems to me that the contributors to this discussion are missing the 
main point. The Platonist assumes that there are mathematical real 
objects, with precise unalterable properties, and he further believes 
that these properties cannot lead to any inconsistency. And while he may
 use certain definitions that he thinks are a good description of these 
real objects, which enables him to make statements about these objects, 
he will never commit to agreeing that these definitions are absolutely 
correct definitions of the real objects of his Platonism. The result is 
that if any inconsistency (or indeed, any undesired outcome) is found to
 result from any such definition, then, as far as the Platonist is 
concerned, then it is the definition that is at fault, not the real 
objects of his Platonism.

It follows that any attempt to falsify 
Platonism is bound to fail. Since a Platonist refuses to commit to 
define precisely what he means by, for example,
 a natural number, then it is quite immaterial if one could demonstrate
 an inconsistency in some definition of natural numbers - such as Peano 
arithmetic - because the Platonist position enables the Platonist to 
simply state that it simply shows that the definition isn't a correct 
description of the real objects that are
natural numbers. 		 	   		  
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