[FOM] Goedel on philosophy

Harvey Friedman friedman at math.ohio-state.edu
Wed Mar 7 23:30:39 EST 2007


> Neither Mr. Buckner nor Mr. Hardy seems to be aware that there are
> five volumes of Goedel's Collected Works in print (Oxford University
> Press, 1986-2003). There are several papers in volumes II and III
> that would be described as philosophical, including his notes on the
> ontological argument. Other items in these volumes, including the
> correspondence in volumes IV-V, give quite a bit of evidence about
> his engagement with philosophy and what he read.
> 
> Another source is the two books by Hao Wang, _Refelctions on Kurt
> Goedel_ (MIT Press, 1987) and _A Logical Journey: From Goedel to
> Philosophy_ (MIT Press, 1986), as well as papers in various
> publications, in particular the Bulletin of Symbolic Logic.
> 
> Charles Parsons

I wonder how Goedel's view of philosophy relates to my own. I'm not sure.

In my own view, there are a number of great intellectual structures that
obviously constitute powerful and far reaching vehicles for systematic
knowledge. 

A crude delineation of these would correspond roughly to Departments in a
University: mathematics, physics, statistics, law, linguistics, etcetera. A
deeper delineation of these involves subdividing such crude categories, and
recognizing overlaps.

A certain kind of intellectual development must take place before such
vehicles for systematic knowledge can emerge.

The hallmark of the relevant kind of intellectual development is a
particular form of what should be called philosophical thinking. Here one
focuses on the choice of fundamental concepts, the drawing of fundamental
distinctions, the framing of methodologies, etcetera.

In this kind of philosophical thinking, there is a great deal of
experimentation, and concentration on "fruitful" paths. Fruitfulness is
measured in terms of how pursuit of these paths moves us closer to the
emergence of powerful systematic knowledge.

This is the critical place where my own view of philosophy differs
considerably from professional philosophers.

A certain critical level of such development, through philosophical
thinking, is needed for a vehicle for systematic knowledge to emerge. After
this critical level is achieved, the vehicle attains a certain amount of
autonomy. At some point, the vehicle enjoys an existence independent of
philosophy. 

Normally, at that point, the associated philosophical activity wanes, and
the emergent vehicle is regarded as wholly outside philosophy.

However, there is always a very considerable opportunity to continue with
the philosophical thinking, even after the vehicles have long since attained
an autonomous existence outside philosophy.

(Generally speaking, those involved in the direct development of such
vehicles will not engage in philosophical thinking, generally preferring to
work within comparatively rigid frameworks.)

This is to rework and refine and expand the foundations through
philosophical thinking, but fully armed with the techniques and insights
that have come from advanced stages of development of the vehicle.

The most obvious, most dramatic, and most generally generally recognized
example in "recent" times of this process was the emergence and development
of mathematical logic, and certain aspects of computer science, through such
philosophers as Frege, Russell, and such philosophical thinkers as Cantor,
Turing, Goedel. 

Some of the ongoing work in philosophy of science and philosophy of language
and other areas are definitely viable candidates for such productive
philosophy, but the case is certainly not yet overwhelming.

However, I hold considerable optimism for the future of such parts of
philosophy, when (as is inevitable) smart people with the right mix of
abilities and knowledge get seriously involved, perhaps in pairs or teams.

Obviously, this is a very outcomes based view of philosophy. One might
called this *applied philosophy*. Nevertheless, philosophical thinking is an
essential ingredient, and it makes sense to distinguish this kind of
thinking from other kinds.

Why? Because a typical top researcher outside philosophy does not engage in
such thinking, and is quite suspicious of it, and grossly undervalues it.
However, the atypical top researcher, such as Albert Einstein, obviously
engaged in such thinking at critical junctures.

Harvey Friedman



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