[FOM] Mathematical conceptualism
Roger Bishop Jones
rbj01 at rbjones.com
Tue Sep 20 04:09:56 EDT 2005
On Monday 19 September 2005 11:10 pm, Nik Weaver wrote:
> The case for predicativism: (1) the idea that there exists an
> abstract, metaphysical, Platonic world of sets is nonsensical
> and is discredited by the set-theoretic paradoxes; (2) once
> this is accepted...
Well, I for one do not accept it.
I have skimmed quickly over the reasons cited in your paper
for rejecting classical set theory, and disagree about
whether the facts you cite under this heading constitute
reason for abandoning set theory (or even cause for serious
I would be happy to discuss the merits and force
of these criticisms, but, until such time as I am convinced
that set theory is unsatisfactory, my interest in the
rest of your material will be limited.
Your chances of stimulating an interesting discussion
are not improved by describing your opponents' standpoint
as nonsensical and discredited.
However, I do not consider myself a "Platonist",
set theory does not depend on Platonism.
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