[FOM] Deflationism and the Godel phenomena
Joseph VidalRosset
joseph.vidalrosset at ubourgogne.fr
Thu Feb 17 07:51:07 EST 2005
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Aatu Koskensilta a écrit :

 On Feb 16, 2005, at 12:58 PM, Joseph VidalRosset wrote:

> Jeffrey Ketland a écrit :
>
>  (ii) The Adequacy Condition (adding truth axioms should give a proof of
>  reflection principles, and in particular "All theorems of S are true").
>
> Do we need at this point to grow up to the second order? I believe it.


 Only if we want to be able to define the truth predicate explicitly.
Thanks.
But this logicophilosophical debate around deflationism about truth
tries to define truth explicitly, wondering after its substantial or
nonsubstantial property.
Gödel believed in truth as substantial, no doubt, but neither Tarski nor
Carnap did. The point is to see if mathematical logic can decide who is
right, and I have some doubt about the decidability of this
philosophical question. But I'm maybe wrong.
Jo.
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