[FOM] The rule of generalization in FOL, and pseudo-theorems
Neil Tennant
neilt at mercutio.cohums.ohio-state.edu
Sat Sep 4 13:49:43 EDT 2004
On Fri, 3 Sep 2004, Richard Zach wrote:
> Dear Sandy et al.,
>
> You raise an interesting question. I don't know of a recent textbook
> calculus of first-order logic in which all theorems are sentences.
My book Natural Logic (Edinburgh U. Press, 1978; 2nd, revd. edn 1990)
follows Prawitz's monograph Natural Deduction (Almqvist & Wiksell,
Stockholm, 1965) in allowing only sentences to occur in proofs. Hence only
sentences can be premises or conclusions of proofs. In particular, only
sentences can be theorems.
If one proves a theorem of the form F(a), then of course one extra step of
universal introduction would produce the explicitly general theorem
(x)F(x).
Neil Tennant
More information about the FOM
mailing list