[FOM] Godel Sentence

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Vladimir Sazonov says:

 >It could be said 
 >that they are intuitively (informally) true.

  Exactly as intuitively or informally true as the fundamental theorem
of arithmetic, or any other mathematical theorem.

  >Thus, consis(PA) (as formulated in the metatheory PA for PA 
  >itself) says about *imaginary* proofs in PA of such a length which 
  >no mathematician can ever write even with the help of powerful 
  >computers whereas, intuitively, the consistency of PA may be 
  >considered  a very informal statement on feasible proofs, that 
  >*nobody* can *really* deduce a contradiction in PA.

  Exactly as imaginary as large numbers n which the fundamental theorem
of arithmetic states have a unique prime decomposition. There's nothing
special about Gödel's theorem.

  >I would rather prefer to tell about 
  >a correspondence of provable sentences to our intuition and 
  >external reality, instead of "truth", and this is the real practice 
  >of mathematics, especially of applied one. 

  "Correspondence to our intuition and external reality" is a very
doubtful philosophical notion, as opposed to the mathematically
defined "true sentence".

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