[FOM] The liar and the semantics of set theory (expansion)

[Rupert McCallum]

I briefly wavered on whether my definition of *truth *predicate was
satisfactory.

I said, say phi is a *truth *predicate (actually, let's call that a
weak *truth *predicate) if we have that x *satisfies phi iff x is the
Goedel code of a *true sentence.

And say phi is a strong *truth *predicate if we have that x *satisfies
phi iff x is the Goedel code of a *true sentence, and *satisfies ~phi
iff x is the Goedel code of a *false sentence. 

Of course the liar paradox blocks a strong *truth *predicate even in
the absence of bivalence, so you must have meant a weak *truth
*predicate. 

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