[FOM] Another easy solution does not work
Sandy Hodges
SandyHodges at attbi.com
Thu Sep 19 14:16:19 EDT 2002
> Actually, under the Barwise/Etchemendy treatment of propositions (at
> least what they call "Russellian propositions"), each proposition in
> the above infinite list is again just the Liar, and thus is
> paradoxical.
>
> Todd Wilson
Consider these:
1. There is life on Mars.
2. Socrates on Tuesday said "Sentence 1 is true" and he said nothing
else that day.
3. What Socrates said on Tuesday is true.
4. Plato on Tuesday said "Sentence 1 is true" and he said nothing else
that day.
5. What Plato said on Tuesday is true.
6. Sentence 1 is true.
By the Barwise and Etchemendy Russellian position, if 2 and 4 are true,
then 3 and 5 are tokens of the same proposition. But what if their
truth status is not known? Surely 6 is a proposition: it is not one
proposition if there is life on Mars, and a different one if there
isn't. If 3 and 5 are also propositions, and not functions of the
truth status of 2 and 4, then 3 and 5 can't be the same proposition,
since 3 tells us something about Socrates' Tuesday activities, and 5
does not.
In Yablo's example, the author of each proposition believed it to be
true that someone after him in line was believing a false proposition,
but he did not know which false proposition that was (only we know
that). So the propositions can't be the same, as each conveys
information about a different collection of people.
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Sandy Hodges / Alameda, California, USA
mail to SandyHodges at attbi.com will reach me.
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