FOM: North Pole Argument (Frege #1)
Dean.Buckner at btopenworld.com
Mon Apr 29 15:08:02 EDT 2002
This is the first in a series of short objections to Frege's arguments about
#1 The North Pole Argument
Frege argues, in discussing Jevons' and Schroder's theory of number (GL
~~40-44), that a proposition like "a is different from b" cannot "give" the
number 2. He objects that if so, "the Earth has two poles" must be true iff
"the North Pole is different from the South Pole" is true.
Whereas, he says, either can be true without the other.
Of course, but this is quite spurious. "The North Pole" (like "Dartmouth")
is just a proper name in disguise. The real equivalence is between "the
Earth has two poles" and "the Earth has a pole x and the Earth has a pole y
and x is a different thing from y".
Thus his argument does not disprove that difference between objects (not
concepts) can yield the concept of number.
Counter-objections warmly invited.
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