FOM: Kreisel: Objects and objectivity

[Michael Detlefsen]

In the 1958 review that Bill mentioned, there is a remark that relates to
this thread. On p. 138, note 1, Kreisel writes:

"... it should be noted that Wittgenstein argues against a notion of
mathematical object (presumably: substance), but, at least in places ...
not against the objectivity of mathematics, especially through his
recognition of formal facts ..."

He makes similar or related remarks in the following places:

(i) p. 97 of his 1965 paper "Two notes on the foundations of set theory".
(ii) pp. 219f of his 1965 paper "Mathematical logic: what has it done for
the philosophy of mathematics?"
(iii) p. 20 of his 1970 paper, "The formalist-positivist doctrine of
mathematical precision in the light of experience".

>From a warm and fragrant South Bend,
Mic Detlefsen