FOM: weak realism, bivalence, and Godel
neilt at mercutio.cohums.ohio-state.edu
Thu Jun 15 08:51:59 EDT 2000
Randall Holmes wrote:
> ... I agree that "bivalence" can be viewed as a separate issue from
> But I find the attempt to construe Godel as a "weak realist" of this
> kind quite incredible. It is very clear from his essay on the continuum
> problem (and even from the excerpts exhibited on the list) that he was
> a realist in the strong sense that mathematical propositions, whether
> we know how to decide them or not, are either true or false.
No one is denying that Godel was a realist in the strong sense.
What is being denied is that he ever *derived* such realism from a belief
in the objective existence of mathematical *objects*. The recent
discussion on fom about ontological realism and realism about truth-value
is whether the former *implies* the latter.
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