FOM: Is `weak realism' possible?
pschust at rz.mathematik.uni-muenchen.de
Wed Jun 14 05:34:40 EDT 2000
>From the postings
Neil Tennant Tue, 13 Jun 2000 13:45:34 -0400 (EDT)
Mark Steiner Tue, 13 Jun 2000 20:49:52 +0300
I understand that some sort of `weak realism' is philosophically
possible, which assumes the existence of certain objects but not
the knowledge of all truth values, and that Goedel presumably
had such a standpoint ( by the way, I could never believe what
one is frequently told, that he was an unreflected Platonist ).
However, is there any *committed realist* who would like to argue
against the possibility of a `weak realism', who maintains that
the law of bivalence has to be part of any realism?! As I learned from
the recent debate on constructive mathematics, there must be some.
PS Many thanks to Neil and Mark for their contributions.
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