FOM: Re. intuitionism, Tennant, McLarty, et al
neilt at mercutio.cohums.ohio-state.edu
Mon Sep 14 15:49:20 EDT 1998
I would like to thank Mic Detlefsen for his very thought-provoking and informative response regarding Brouwer's position on the OF v. THAT issue that had arisen earlier.
It would be helpful, in trying to understand Brouwer's failure to make the distinction, if Mic could provide textual references where one can pursue the evidence for his (Mic's) summary to the effect that
>Brouwer thought of the epistemic purpose of
>proof (even a long one) as that of securing AN intuition of the theorem
>proved. (N.B. Brouwer seemed to think that knowledge of a truth required a
>certain 'unity' in its justification ... a unity that calls for a proof to
>express a single idea--an intuition.
For, it seems, this would have to be one of the main issues on which
modern intuitionism will have forsaken its founding father.
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