FOM: aboutness

[Reuben Hersh]

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> on saturday january 17 charles silver wrote:
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> >   > 	From what you have said, I think you don't see something that I
> >   > take to be entirely obvious; namely, that AGREEMENT and ABOUTNESS are on
> >   > two entirely different levels. From my point of view, you keep
> >   > *conflating* the two levels.  You wish to keep speaking about the nature
> >   > of the *agreement* and you refuse to talk about what the agreement is
> >   > *about*. That X and Y agree, that their agreement may (or may not be)
> >   about anything.
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>    Today, Saturday, january 17, Reuben Hersh replies:

	>   OK, how's this.
> >   
> >   There is a definite, intersubjective, human, mathematical concept
> >   known as the right triangle.
> >   
> >   It isn't about anything, it's an entity per se, not a name.
> >   
> >   The Pythagorean theorem is about something.  Namely, the
> >   aforesaid right triangle.
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> >   Mathematical objects aren't about anything, they just are
> >   intersubjective human concepts.
> >   
> >   Mathematical statements are about something.  Namely,
> >   mathematical objects.
> >   
> >   Reuben Hersh
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