Computer Science Colloquium
Transparent Achievement of Correlated Equilibrium
Friday, November 10, 2006, 2006 11:30 A.M.
Room 1302 Warren Weaver Hall
251 Mercer Street
New York, NY 10012-1185
Colloquium Information: http://cs.nyu.edu/csweb/Calendar/colloquium/index.html
Yevgeniy Dodis href="mailto:firstname.lastname@example.org">email@example.com, (212) 998-3094
As introduced by Aumann, correlated equilibrium is a powerful game
theoretic NOTION, generalizing that of Nash equilibrium with
significant advantages. REACHING correlated equilibrium, however, has
proved quite problematic, both conceptually and algorithmically.
We put forward a new and compelling notion of reaching correlated
equilibrium, and show that it is always and efficiently attainable via
ballots and a ballot-randomizing device.
(Joint work with Izmalkov, Lepinski and shelat)
Refreshments will be served
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