Computer Science Colloquium

Transparent Achievement of Correlated Equilibrium

Silvio Micali
MIT

Friday, November 10, 2006, 2006 11:30 A.M.
Room 1302 Warren Weaver Hall
251 Mercer Street
New York, NY 10012-1185

Directions: http://cs.nyu.edu/csweb/Location/directions.html
Colloquium Information: http://cs.nyu.edu/csweb/Calendar/colloquium/index.html

Hosts:

Yevgeniy Dodis href="mailto:dodis@cs.nyu.edu">dodis@cs.nyu.edu, (212) 998-3094

Abstract

As introduced by Aumann, correlated equilibrium is a powerful game theoretic NOTION, generalizing that of Nash equilibrium with significant advantages. REACHING correlated equilibrium, however, has proved quite problematic, both conceptually and algorithmically.

We put forward a new and compelling notion of reaching correlated equilibrium, and show that it is always and efficiently attainable via ballots and a ballot-randomizing device.

(Joint work with Izmalkov, Lepinski and shelat)

Refreshments will be served


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