SPEAKER: Vinod Vaikuntanathan TITLE: Cryptography against Memory Attacks Authors: Adi Akavia, Shafi Goldwasser, Vino Vaikuntanathan (Proc. of TCC 2009) ABSTRACT: The absolute privacy of the secret keys associated with cryptographic algorithms has been the corner-stone of modern cryptography. Still, there is ample evidence in practice that keys do get compromised at times, by various means. In a particularly devastating side-channel attack proposed recently, termed the ``memory attack'', a significant fraction of the bits of the secret key can be measured if the secret key is {\em ever stored} in a part of memory which can be accessed. Such an attack has been shown to completely compromise the security of various crypto-systems in use, including RSA and AES. We show two *public-key encryption schemes* secure against memory attacks that leak upto (1-\epsilon) bits of information about the secret-key (for any constant epsilon>0). The first of these is the lattice-based encryption scheme of Regev, and the second is a DDH-based encryption scheme recently proposed by Boneh, Halevi, Hamburg and Ostrovsky. This is done without increasing the size of the secret key, and without introducing any complication of the natural encryption and decryption routines. http://www.mit.edu/~vinodv/papers/AGV-proc.pdf